Why Bohr was (Mostly) Right by Bub, Jeffrey
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
01
60
4v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
5 N
ov
 20
17
Why Bohr Was (Mostly) Right
Jeffrey Bub
Philosophy Department
Institute for Physical Science and Technology
Joint Center for Quantum Information and Computer Science
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA
Abstract
After a discussion of the Frauchiger-Renner argument that no “single-
world” interpretation of quantum mechanics can be self-consistent, I pro-
pose a “Bohrian” alternative to many-worlds or QBism as the rational op-
tion.
In a January 17, 2013 post to his blog Preposterous Universe,1 Sean Car-
roll commented on a poll about foundational attitudes to quantum mechanics.2
The title of Carroll’s blog post was “The Most Embarrassing Graph in Modern
Physics.” One of the poll questions was “What is your favorite interpretation of
quantum mechanics?” The responses were mixed, with a plurality of 42% for the
Copenhagen interpretation. Carroll comments:
I’ll go out on a limb to suggest that the results of this poll should
be very embarrassing to physicists. Not, I hasten to add, because
Copenhagen came in first, although that’s also a perspective I might
want to defend (I think Copenhagen is completely ill-defined, and
shouldn’t be the favorite anything of any thoughtful person). The
embarrassing thing is that we don’t have agreement.
The Copenhagen interpretation, a motley collection of commentary by physicists
like Heisenberg, Pauli, Rosenfeld, and others in the Bohr camp, is not quite the
same as Bohr’s complementarity interpretation, as the response to the question in
the poll about Bohr’s view of quantum mechanics attests—only 21% thought it
was correct and 27% thought it was wrong.
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I want to suggest a way of understanding Bohr that is not at all ill-defined and
should be the favorite interpretation of any thoughtful person. To be clear, I don’t
intend to offer a scholarly exegesis of Bohr’s essays on quantum mechanics or to
quote Bohr to support a claim about what he really meant. Rather, I will argue
that this is what Bohr ought to have meant, and that what he ought to have meant
is not so far off from what he wrote on complementarity.
To motivate the discussion, I first want to consider a recent “no go” result
by Frauchiger and Renner,3 a novel re-formulation of the “Wigner’s friend” ar-
gument,4 with a twist that exploits Hardy’s paradox.5 The argument purports to
show that no “single-world” interpretation of quantum mechanics can be self-
consistent, where a single-world interpretation is any interpretation that asserts
that, in a measurement with multiple possible outcomes, just one outcome actu-
ally occurs. Frauchiger and Renner conclude that “we are forced to give up the
view that there is one single reality.”
Here’s how the argument goes: Alice measures an observable A with eigen-
states |h〉A, |t〉A on a system in the state 1√
3
|h〉A +
√
2√
3
|t〉A. One could say that
Alice “tosses a biased quantum coin” with probabilities 1/3 for heads and 2/3 for
tails. She prepares a qubit in the state |0〉B if the outcome is h, or in the state
1√
2
(|0〉B + |1〉B) if the outcome is t, and sends it to Bob. When Bob receives the
qubit, he measures the qubit observable B with eigenstates |0〉B, |1〉B. After Al-
ice and Bob obtain definite outcomes for their measurements, the quantum state of
the combined quantum coin and qubit system is |h〉A|0〉B or |t〉A|0〉B or |t〉A|1〉B,
with equal probability. At least, that’s the state of quantum coin and qubit system
from the perspective of Alice and Bob.
Now, the quantum coin and the qubit, as well as Alice and Bob, their mea-
suring instruments and all the systems in their laboratories that become entangled
with the measuring instruments in registering and recording the outcomes of the
quantum coin toss and the qubit measurement, including the entangled environ-
ment, are just two big many-body quantum systems SA and SB , which are as-
sumed to be completely isolated from each other after Bob receives Alice’s qubit
The symbols A and B could represent “super-observables” of the composite sys-
tems SA and SB that end up with definite values corresponding to the outcomes
of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements on the quantum coin and the qubit.
Consider a super-observer, with vast technological abilities, who contemplates
measuring a super-observable X of SA with eigenstates |fail〉A = 1√
2
(|h〉A +
|t〉A), |ok〉A = 1√
2
(|h〉A − |t〉A), and a super-observable Y of SB with eigen-
states |fail〉B = 1√
2
(|0〉B + |1〉B), |ok〉B = 1√
2
(|0〉B − |1〉B), where |h〉A, |t〉A and
2
|0〉B, |1〉B now represent eigenstates of the super-observables A and B, and {h, t}
and {0, 1} represent the corresponding eigenvalues.∗
Of course, such a measurement would be extraordinarily difficult to carry out
in practice on the whole composite system, including all the systems in the envi-
ronment, but nothing in quantum mechanics precludes this possibility. From the
super-observer’s perspective, SA and SB are just composite many-body entangled
quantum systems that have evolved unitarily to a combined entangled state:
|ψ〉 = 1√
3
(|h〉A|0〉B + |t〉A|0〉B + |t〉A|1〉B) (1)
TheA andB values simply don’t appear anywhere in the super-observer’s descrip-
tion of events, so the super-observer sees no reason to conditionalize the state to
one of the product states |h〉A|0〉B or |t〉A|0〉B or |t〉1|1〉B. For the super-observer,
this would seem to require a suspension of unitary evolution in favor of an unex-
plained collapse of the quantum state.
But now we have a contradiction. The state |ψ〉 can also be expressed as:
|ψ〉 = 1√
12
|ok〉A|ok〉B − 1√
12
|ok〉A|fail〉B
+
1√
12
|fail〉A|ok〉B +
√
3
4
|fail〉A|fail〉B (2)
=
√
2
3
|fail〉A|0〉B + 1√
3
|t〉A|1〉B (3)
=
1√
3
|h〉A|0〉B +
√
2
3
|t〉A|fail〉B (4)
From the first expression for |ψ〉, the probability is 1/12 that the super-observer
finds the pair of outcomes {ok, ok} in a joint measurement ofX and Y on the two
systems. But this outcome is inconsistent with any pair of outcomes for Alice’s
and Bob’s measurements. From the second expression, the pair {ok, 0} has zero
probability, so {ok, 1} is the only possible pair of values for the super-observables
X,B if X has the value ok. From the third expression, the pair {t, ok} has zero
probability, so {h, ok} is the only possible pair of values for the super-observables
∗Since SA and SB are isolated systems, we should really consider two super-observers: a
super-observer who measuresX on SA and a second super-observer who measures Y on SB . For
simplicity, I’ll continue to refer to a super-observer who measures X ⊗ Y , bearing in mind that
this is really a composite of two super-observers.
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A, Y if Y has the value ok. But the pair of values {h, 1} for the super-observables
A and B has zero probability in the state |ψ〉, so it does not correspond to a
possible pair of measurement outcomes for Alice and Bob.†
Both the observer (Alice and Bob), and the super-observer (the two super-
observers who measure SA and SB) apply quantum mechanics correctly. The
argument depends only on (i) the one-world assumption, that a measurement has
a single outcome, (ii) the assumption that quantum mechanics applies to systems
of any complexity, including observers, and (iii) self-consistency, in particular
agreement between an observer and a super-observer. The surprising conclusion
is that there is no consistent story that includes an observer and a super-observer:
a possible outcome, according to quantum mechanics, of a super-observer’s mea-
surement of a super-observable X ⊗ Y of the whole composite observer system
is inconsistent with the observer obtaining an actual outcome for any of the pos-
sible values of the measured observable A ⊗ B. It’s the theoretical possibility of
a super-observer that shows the inconsistency of the theory. As far as we know,
there are no super-observers, but the actuality of a measurement outcome can’t
depend on whether or not a super-observer turns up at some point.
What are the options? David Wallace makes a useful distinction between rep-
resentational and probabilistic interpretations of the quantum state.6 If the quan-
tum state is interpreted representationally, as the analogue of the classical state in
stipulating what’s true and what’s false, and we accept assumption (ii) and hence
the universality of unitarity (so no collapse of the quantum state), the correct de-
scription of the composite system SA + SB just before the super-observer’s mea-
surement is the entangled state (2), a superposition with several components, each
associated with a different measurement outcome. Dropping assumption (i) then
leads to Everett’s many-world interpretation, the preferred option of Frauchiger
and Renner.
If we interpret the quantum state probabilistically, then we seem to be forced
to QBism, the quantum Bayesianism of Christopher Fuchs and Ruediger Schack.7
The QBist rejects assumption (iii), the self-consistency assumption. On this view,
all probabilities, including quantum probabilities, are understood in the subjective
sense as the personal judgements of an agent, based on how the external world
responds to actions by the agent. For QBists, the Born rule “is a normative state-
ment . . . about the decision-making behavior any individual agent should strive for
†Since the composite systems SA and SB are assumed to be completely isolated from each
other, the no-signaling principle ensures that the outcome of a measurement on one of the systems
can’t depend on whether or not a measurement is performed on the other system.
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. . . not a “law of nature” in the usual sense,” and “measurement outcomes just are
personal experiences for the agent gambling upon them.”8 So there is no require-
ment that the perspective of an observer and a super-observer should be consistent.
There is another option if we interpret the quantum state probabilistically,
which is to reject assumption (ii)—not by restricting the universality of the unitary
dynamics or any part of quantum mechanics, but by placing a constraint on how
the theory is applied. In Bananaworld 9 I called this interpretation “information-
theoretic,” but here I want to emphasize the connection with Bohr’s view.
Quantum mechanics began with Heisenberg’s “Umdeutung” paper, his pro-
posed “reinterpretation” of physical quantities as noncommutative.10 To say that
the algebra of physical quantities is commutative is equivalent to saying that the
idempotent elements form a Boolean algebra. For the physical quantities or ob-
servables of a quantum system represented by self-adjoint Hilbert space operators,
the idempotent elements are the projection operators, with eigenvalues 0 and 1.
They represent yes-no observables, or properties (for example, the property that
the energy of the system lies in a certain range of values), or propositions (the
proposition asserting that the value of the energy lies in this range), with the two
eigenvalues corresponding to the truth values, true and false.
Heisenberg’s insight amounts to the proposal that certain phenomena in our
Boolean macro-world that defy a classical physical explanation can be explained
probabilistically as a manifestation of collective behavior at a non-Boolean micro-
level. The Boolean algebra of physical properties of classical mechanics is re-
placed by a family of “intertwined” Boolean algebras, one for each set of com-
muting observables, to use Gleason’s term.11 The intertwinement precludes the
possibility of embedding the whole collection into one inclusive Boolean algebra,
so you can’t assign truth values consistently to the propositions about observable
values in all these Boolean algebras. Putting it differently, the different perspec-
tives associated with certain Boolean algebras in the family of Boolean algebras
of a quantum system, say the Boolean algebras for position and momentum, don’t
fit together into a single Boolean algebra, unlike the corresponding family for a
classical system. Welcome to complementarity.
Bohr did not refer to Boolean algebras, but the concept is simply a precise
way of codifying what I think Bohr should have had in mind by insisting (his
emphasis) that12
however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical
explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical
terms.
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by which he meant “unambiguous language with suitable application of the ter-
minology of classical physics”—for the simple reason, as he put it, that we need
to be able to “tell others what we have done and what we have learned.” Formally
speaking, the significance of “classical” here as being able to “tell others what
we have done and what we have learned” is that the events in question should
fit together as a Boolean algebra. George Boole, who came up with the idea in
the mid-1800’s, introduced Boolean constraints on probability as “conditions of
possible experience.”13
Bohr’s primary insight was to see that quantum mechanics is quite unlike any
theory we have dealt with before in the history of physics, and so explanation in
such a post-classical theory can’t be the sort of representational explanation we
are familiar with in a theory that is commutative or Boolean at the fundamental
level. Quantum probabilities can’t be understood in the classical (I would say
Boolean) sense as quantifying ignorance about the pre-measurement value of an
observable, but cash out in terms of what you’ll find if you “measure,” which
involves considering the outcome, at the Boolean macrolevel, of manipulating a
quantum system in a certain way.
A quantum “measurement” is a bit of a misnomer and not really the same
sort of thing as a measurement of a physical quantity of a classical system. It
involves putting a microystem, like a photon, in a situation, say a beamsplitter
or an analyzing filter, where the photon is forced to make an intrinsically ran-
dom transition recorded as one of two macroscopically distinct alternatives in a
device like a photon detector. The registration of the measurement outcome at
the Boolean macrolevel is crucial, because it is only with respect to a suitable
structure of alternative possibilities that it makes sense to talk about an event as
definitely occurring or not occurring, and this structure is a Boolean algebra.
There are various ways to see how a Boolean macroworld could emerge from
the intertwined Boolean algebras at the microlevel, but they are all approximate
and to some extent conceptually fuzzy. We are familiar in physics with collec-
tive phenomena at the macrolevel that can be quite different from the behavior of
individual systems at the microlevel. For example, the air has a temperature, but
individual air molecules don’t. We understand how the temperature of the air is
a collective property of large collections of air molecules, but how to explain the
emergence of a commutative or Boolean macrolevel from an underlying noncom-
mutative or non-Boolean microlevel is trickier. It is still to some extent an ongoing
research problem,14 but it is not, fundamentally, an interpretative problem.‡
‡In the last section, “The Information-Theoretic Interpretation,” of the final chapter of Ba-
6
The quantum revolution is about new sorts of probabilistic correlations in na-
ture, analogous to the sense in which the relativistic revolution is about new sorts
of spatio-temporal relations. What Hilbert space gives you is fundamentally a the-
ory of probabilistic correlations. Probabilities and probabilistic correlations arise
as a feature of the non-Boolean structure. They are “uniquely given from the start,”
to quote von Neumann,17 related to the angles in Hilbert space, not measures over
states as they are in a classical or Boolean theory. The intertwinement of com-
muting and noncommuting observables in Hilbert space imposes objective pre-
dynamic probabilistic constraints on correlations between events, analogous to
the way in which Minkowski space-time imposes kinematic constraints on events.
The probabilistic constraints encoded in the geometry of Hilbert space provide
the framework for the physics of a genuinely indeterministic universe. They char-
acterize the way probabilities fit together in a world in which there are nonlocal
probabilistic correlations that violate Bell’s inequality up to the Tsirelson bound,
and these correlations can only occur between intrinsically random events.18
So quantum probabilities are “sui generis,” as von Neumann also put it.19 They
don’t quantify incomplete knowledge about an ontic state (the basic idea of “hid-
den variables”), but reflect the irreducibly probabilistic relation between the non-
Boolean microlevel and the Boolean macrolevel, expressed through the intrinsic
randomness of events associated with the outcomes of quantum measurements.
Here it is crucial, as the Frauchiger-Renner argument shows, that the reference is
to one ultimate observer system as the end-point of a quantum mechanical analy-
sis. Bohr repeatedly emphasizes this:20
In the system to which the quantum mechanical formalism is applied,
it is of course possible to include any intermediate auxiliary agency
employed in the measuring processes. . . . The only significant point is
nanaworld 15 I discussed Hepp’s toy model of quantum measurement, in which a macroscopic
measurement pointer is represented by an infinite array of qubits, and suggested that this was
a way to see how quantum probabilities of “what you’ll obtain if you measure” could become
classical probabilities in the ignorance sense of “what’s there.” I noted Bell’s critique that the tran-
sition only occurs at the infinite limit but argued that this was similar to the idealization involved
in explaining phase transitions in classical physics, as in the transition from a liquid to a solid.
As Matthew Leifer pointed out at a workshop on Bananaworld at Western University, London,
Ontario in June, 2016,16 the physical significance of a singular limit, as in Hepp’s model, is ques-
tionable. Following Matt’s criticism, I have completely revised this section of the chapter for a
paperback edition of Bananaworld. As I now see it, the pathology of the singular limit actually
supports a Bohrian analysis of measurement in quantum mechanics. The fact that quantum proba-
bilities only become classical ignorance probabilities at the infinite limit is another way of seeing
that events at the Boolean macrolevel are outside quantum theory.
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that in each case some ultimate measuring instruments, like the scales
and clocks which determine the frame of space-time coordination—
on which, in the last resort, even the definition of momentum and
energy quantities rest—must always be described entirely on classical
lines, and consequently be kept outside the system subject to quantum
mechanical treatment.
The outcome of a measurement is an intrinsically random event at the macro-
level, not described by the deterministic dynamical evolution of the quantum the-
ory. In this sense it is outside the theory, or “irrational” as Pauli characterizes it
(his emphasis):21
Observation thereby takes on the character of irrational, unique actu-
ality with unpredictable outcome. . . . Contrasted with this irrational
aspect of concrete phenomena which are determined in their actu-
ality, there stands the rational aspect of an abstract ordering of the
possibilities of statements by means of the mathematical concept of
probability and the ψ-function [I would say ‘by means of the geome-
try of Hilbert space’].
The “single ultimate observer system” constraint in the application of quan-
tum mechanics is related to the idea of a movable “cut” between the observer and
what’s observed, and to Bohr’s concept of a “phenomenon.” The world is funda-
mentally quantum (or non-Boolean), but what we want to explain are phenomena
at the Boolean macrolevel. So we partition the theoretical description into a part
that involves a quantum (non-Boolean) analysis and a part that involves a classical
(Boolean) analysis. The cut imposes a Boolean frame on the world, implemented
physically by the choice of measuring instrument. Since the choice is up to us, the
cut is movable. Of course, once you decide what counts as the ultimate measuring
instrument in a given scenario, the cut is no longer movable. If you move it, you
are “subdividing the phenomenon,” as Bohr puts it, and the two analyses will be
incompatible—in general they won’t both fit into one Boolean frame. In effect, a
phenomenon is an episode from the perspective of a Boolean frame. Information
about a system provided through different Boolean frames that can’t be embedded
into a single Boolean frame is “complementary”: although the information isn’t
additive, it provides different perspectives that would be additive and part of one
Boolean frame in a classical theory.
To quote Bohr:22
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The unaccustomed features of the situation with which we are con-
fronted in quantum theory necessitate the greatest caution as regards
all questions of terminology. . . . It is certainly far more in accordance
with the structure and interpretation of the quantum mechanical sym-
bolism, as well as with elementary physical principles, to reserve the
world “phenomenon” for the comprehension of the effects observed
under given experimental conditions.
These conditions, which include the account of the properties and ma-
nipulation of all measuring instruments essentially concerned, consti-
tute in fact the only basis for the definition of the concepts by which
the phenomenon is described [i.e., a Boolean frame]. It is just in
this sense that phenomena defined by different concepts, correspond-
ing to mutually exclusive experimental arrangements [incompatible
Boolean frames], can unambiguously be regarded as complementary
aspects of the whole obtainable evidence concerning the objects un-
der investigation.
To return to the Frauchiger-Renner argument: just one observer perspective
is legitimate in the application of quantum mechanics, the perspective of the ob-
server for whom an actual measurement outcome occurs at the macrolevel. If Al-
ice and Bob represent a composite ultimate observer for whom there are definite
events at the macrolevel, the observer perspective is legitimate, in which case the
final state of the combined quantum coin and qubit system is |h〉A|0〉B or |t〉A|0〉B
or |t〉A|1〉B. If a super-observer subsequently measures the super-observables
X, Y on the whole composite Alice-Bob system, the probability of obtaining the
pair of outcomes {ok, ok} is 1/4 for any of the product states |h〉A|0〉B or |t〉A|0〉B
or |t〉A|1〉B (here interpreted as representing eigenstates of the super-observables
A,B). After the measurement, the super-observables A,B are indefinite, and so
are the corresponding quantum coin and qubit observables. There is no contra-
diction because the argument from the alternative expressions for the entangled
state no longer applies. If the super-observer perspective is legitimate, there are
no definite Alice and Bob events at the macrolevel and the state is the entangled
state. The probability of a super-observer finding the pair of outcomes {ok, ok}
is 1/12, but there is no contradiction because there are no measurement outcome
events for Alice and Bob.
It’s not that unitarity is suppressed at a certain level of complexity, where non-
Booleanity becomes Booleanity and quantum becomes classical. Rather, there is
a macrolevel, which is Boolean (Bohr would say “classical’), and there are actual
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events at the macrolevel. But any system, of any complexity, is fundamentally
a quantum system and can be treated as such, in principle. A unitary dynami-
cal analysis of a measurement process goes as far as you would like it to go, to
whatever level of precision is convenient. The collapse, as a conditionalization
of the quantum state, is something you put in by hand after observing the actual
outcome. The physics doesn’t give it to you.
Special relativity, as a theory about the structure of space-time, provides an
explanation for length contraction and time dilation through the geometry of Min-
kowski space-time, but that’s as far as it goes. This explanation didn’t satisfy
Lorentz, who wanted a dynamical explanation in terms of forces acting on phys-
ical systems used as rods and clocks.23 Quantum mechanics, as a theory about
randomness and nonlocality, provides an explanation for probabilistic constraints
on events through the geometry of Hilbert space, but that’s as far as it goes.
This explanation doesn’t satisfy Everettians, who insist on a representational story
about how nature pulls off the trick of producing intrinsically random events at the
macrolevel, with nonlocal probabilistic correlations constrained by the Tsirelson
bound.
Do we really want to give up the concept of measurement as a procedure
that provides information about the actual value of an observable of a system
to preserve the ideal of representational explanation in physics? It seems far more
rational to accept that if current physical theory has it right, the nature of reality,
the way things are, limits the sort of explanation that a physical theory provides.
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